

# PUTTING AN END TO WORLD HUNGER

The European Union's role  
in transforming the global  
food system

Recommendations for the European Union's  
institutional cycle 2024-2029



**OXFAM**

Promoting food production and distribution that are socially equitable and environmentally sustainable is a necessity, and the topic is as relevant as ever – in Europe and globally. The increase in the number of food crises brought on by climate change highlights the intertwined nature of agriculture and climate change. Global and European farmer protests underline the need to adopt practices that guarantee a fair income and decent working conditions for all farmers. Pitting climate and environmental goals against what is good for farmers is a false dichotomy. The European Union's institutional cycle 2024–2029 will define the EU's international development, climate, agricultural, and trade policies, as well as its next Multiannual Financial Framework beyond 2027. This is a moment to take a new direction, and the EU can make a positive change.

## **WORLD HUNGER REMAINS DISTRESSINGLY HIGH**

- Globally, nearly 282 million people face high levels of acute food insecurity, requiring urgent food and livelihood assistance.<sup>1</sup>
- Up to 757 million people – 1 out of 11 people worldwide – face hunger.
- More than one-third of people in the world – about 2.8 billion – cannot afford a healthy diet.<sup>2</sup>

Smallholder farmers in the Global South offer enormous untapped potential for fighting global hunger. They already produce an estimated 80% of the food consumed in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>3</sup> If they were better supported – with better access to funding, infrastructure, agricultural inputs, and markets and with better protections for their land rights – they could produce even more healthy and nutritious food accessible to all.

# INTRODUCTION

## Global hunger is not about a lack of food but about a food system in which food is poorly distributed, inaccessible, and unaffordable

In 2022, the world faced its third major food price crisis in 15 years, following the price spikes of 2008 and 2010–11. Although inflation at the international level has eased, domestic food inflation in many low-income countries has not abated. In South Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria, inflation rates are 186%, 105%, and 40%, respectively.<sup>6</sup> Behind the statistics lie millions of stories of hardship, as families struggle to cope with spiralling food prices that push them into debt and leave them with no money to send their children to school or treat them when they get sick.

At the heart of the failure to address global hunger lies the architecture of the global food system. This system is characterised by an industrial agricultural model of high-resource-intensity monocultures, concentration of power in corporations, and heavy dependence on global trade. While millions of people struggle to find their next meal, the world's main agrifood traders earn record profits.<sup>7</sup>

What is needed is a radical overhaul of the system to a model that prioritises access to food, nutritional value, agrobiodiversity, and the resilience of local food systems over the profits of powerful companies. While funding is crucial, fixing the broken global food system is about much more than providing ad hoc money for urgent humanitarian crises or agricultural development programs in selected partner countries. It is about governments adopting better policies across the board to reduce inequality, address climate change, address the root causes of conflicts and crises, support women's rights, and enhance good governance and fairer trade rules.

The EU has already laid out a path to a green transition and a more equitable and environmentally friendly agrifood system through its European Green Deal and its Farm to Fork Strategy, but it has backtracked on these commitments.<sup>8</sup>

The EU's flawed policies on renewable energy, biofuels, and carbon offsets exacerbate pressures on land and stimulate land grabs in low-income countries.<sup>9</sup> The EU's development cooperation policy and international partnerships are increasingly designed to serve its own geopolitical and economic interests through the Global Gateway strategy rather than addressing inequalities and hunger in partner countries.<sup>10</sup> The outsized power of agrifood corporations and structural power imbalances that characterise the global food system have been left untouched by the EU.<sup>11</sup> What's more, the EU is dragging its feet in international negotiations to tackle climate change, likely the greatest challenge of all to global food and nutrition security.<sup>12</sup>

***Farmers around the world produce more than enough to feed everyone on the planet, and in 2024, global cereal production has again reached all-time highs.<sup>4</sup> Yet since 2017 hunger has increased sharply.<sup>5</sup>***

***Paradoxically, despite record harvests and a healthy level of food stocks, the EU has adopted a discourse about the importance of increasing production to guarantee food security. Yet hunger, it is clear, persists not due to a global shortage of food but because people cannot afford it or cannot access it.***

As one of the world's largest economies and the biggest aid donor globally, the EU has a responsibility to support food justice and ensure that planetary boundaries are not transgressed any more than they already are.<sup>13</sup> It must play this role both at home and in global fora such as the G7, the G20, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and the Conference of the Parties (COP).

Oxfam calls on the EU to address head on the triple crisis of hunger, climate change, and inequality and commit to the following:

- 1** Invest in food security: Ensure effective support to small-scale food producers globally.
- 2** Stand for climate justice: Take the climate change threat to food security seriously.
- 3** Limit the EU's global land use footprint: Stop unsustainable and irresponsible land use that drives hunger and inequality.
- 4** Balance the power: Break corporate domination and enhance equitable global food governance.



Fresh vegetable market in Northern Italy.

SECTION

# 1

## INVEST IN FOOD SECURITY:

Ensure effective  
support to  
small-scale food  
producers globally

A rights-based approach, mutual accountability, inclusion of civil society, and transparency must be at the core of any Global Gateway project. Private investments and growth will benefit rural communities in partner countries only if matched with equal investments in sustainability, inclusiveness, and commitment to reducing economic, social and gender inequalities.

The worst levels of hunger and poverty are concentrated in rural areas in low-income countries. This means that investing in the world's 500 million small-scale farmers, who produce 80% of the food consumed in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa<sup>14</sup> and who feed nearly two billion people globally, represents the single biggest opportunity to increase local food production where it is needed while reducing inequality.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, investing in women farmers empowers those women and leads to better nutrition, access to more and better education, and improved livelihoods for their families.<sup>16</sup> Yet women continue to face discriminatory laws and social norms, lack secure land rights, and suffer disproportionate food insecurity and climate change impacts.

In this context, the EU's efforts to promote global food and nutrition security are falling short in several ways. In a major shift in the EU's international partnerships and development policy, the Global Gateway strategy uses development funds to attract private investment in infrastructure in the Global South. This strategy increasingly subordinates efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to the EU's own geopolitical and economic interests and raises the question of why large multinationals such as TotalEnergies and Bayer need public aid money to boost their overseas investments.<sup>17</sup>

In the agrifood sector, the emphasis on the EU's own interest risks overlooking the needs of farmers in low-income partner countries. The growing role of the private sector and the use of blended public-private finance may leave out less economically profitable activities and marginalised small-scale producers, who are harder to reach yet play a key role in food and nutrition security and locally led social and economic development.

The EU's current main financing instrument for external cooperation, the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe, includes no earmarked funding for food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture. In the period 2021-24, the European Commission pulled together EUR 8.3 billion, mainly to respond to the impact of Russia's military offensive in Ukraine on global food security. A large part of the funding (EUR 4.9 billion) was allocated to urgent humanitarian aid and other short-term responses, while EUR 3.4 billion was allocated to medium-term support, including the transition to sustainable food systems.<sup>18</sup>

To achieve lasting change, the EU must step up its support for local food systems and climate-resilient, small-scale agriculture through predictable, long-

### Oxfam calls on the EU to:

- **Prioritise the fight against hunger and promote sustainable small-scale agriculture in the EU's development policy and international partnerships, including in its next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This approach should include providing earmarked funding for food and nutrition security and agroecological practices, anticipating and responding at scale to humanitarian crises, and supporting gender equality and women's empowerment.**
- **Ensure the Global Gateway fosters transparency, accountability, and the participation of civil society in decision-making and implementation. For each project, the EU should publish deliverables and indicators on the reduction of poverty and inequality, including gender inequality.**
- **Ensure that blending grants with private funding or loans, under the Global Gateway or any private sector instrument, does not diminish support for small-scale producers or become a backhanded way to secure EU access to natural resources or serve the commercial interests of its own private sector.**
- **Support partner countries in achieving their food security and agricultural development goals by responding to what is needed in the local context. This should include supporting a transparent and inclusive process and facilitating civil society participation in developing and implementing the African Union's Kampala Declaration.**

term public funding that responds to the needs in partner countries. The African Union's so-called Kampala Declaration and its implementation represent a key policy process that will shape the next decade of agricultural policy in Africa.<sup>19</sup> It provides the EU an opportunity to support indigenous agrifood systems instead of profit-driven action, large-scale monocropping, and corporate control over African agriculture.

SECTION

# 2

## STAND FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE:

Take the climate  
change threat  
to food security  
seriously

It is often those least responsible for historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions who experience the impacts of climate change most acutely.<sup>20</sup> Africa is responsible for less than 4% of all GHG emissions,<sup>21</sup> yet large parts of the continent face a climate crisis that is producing extreme weather, wiping out harvests, exacerbating hunger, and destroying livelihoods. The EU and its member states are accountable for their historical and ongoing contributions to climate change and must step up support to people in vulnerable regions.

The EU has made positive commitments to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation in food systems, but action has not matched the rhetoric. In 2019 the EU committed to tackling the climate crisis by launching the European Green Deal<sup>22</sup> and reducing the EU's net GHG emissions to zero by 2050. In its Farm to Fork Strategy,<sup>23</sup> the EU committed to significantly cutting the use of pesticides and chemical fertilisers, increasing organic farming, reversing biodiversity loss, and focusing its international cooperation on food research and innovation, with reference to agroecology, sustainable land governance, fair value chains, and prevention of food crises. Today, however, the EU is backtracking on these commitments, including by failing to put forward the legislative framework for a sustainable food system, which it had pledged to adopt by the end of 2023.<sup>24</sup>

Despite the growing urgency of climate action, climate adaptation finance is desperately lacking.<sup>25</sup> Between 2019 and 2020 only 4% of global climate finance went to agrifood systems.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, reported figures do not always represent the actual value of support delivered. Rich countries claimed to have mobilized nearly US\$116 billion in 2022 to help low-income countries cope with the worsening effects of climate breakdown. However, 70% of this money was in the form of loans, and Oxfam estimates that the actual value of climate finance provided by rich countries in 2022 was at most US\$35 billion, of which no more than US\$15 billion was earmarked for adaptation.<sup>27</sup> Now, under the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance,<sup>28</sup> the EU must contribute its fair share, as declared at the ministerial meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).<sup>29</sup> It must provide concrete figures and adopt genuine accountability mechanisms to ensure it meets the needs of those on the front line of the climate crisis, including small-scale food producers in low-income countries.

The EU should also continue to promote innovative approaches, such as agroecology, that increase the capacity of agrifood systems to cope with climate change. Agroecology prioritises processes that enhance agriculture's capacity to adapt to local conditions through indigenous knowledge, education, participatory learning, and local capacity building. Evidence shows the positive effects of agroecological diversification on climate adaptation, pollination, pest control, nutrient cycling, water regulation, and soil fertility.<sup>30</sup>

### Oxfam calls on the EU to:

- **Make the transition to sustainable, climate-resilient food systems a high political priority, in Europe and globally. The EU must uphold a holistic approach to food systems policymaking and respect the principle of policy coherence in its domestic and external policies.**
- **Use the outcomes of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture as it formulates and implements EU food and agricultural policies, including fostering an inclusive dialogue.**
- **Ensure adequate, equitable, and accessible climate finance for small-scale food producers in low-income countries, paying special attention to women's access to the funds. EU member states must pay their fair share of the climate financing to which they are committed under the Paris Agreement as well as the NCQG and ensure a transparent and accountable spending of these funds.**
- **In accordance with the European Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy, invest in agroecological practices and support research to mainstream their benefits for food systems in order to mitigate GHG emissions, adapt to climate change, enhance social equity, and preserve biodiversity and soil health, both in Europe and globally.**
- **Present a comprehensive plan to increase the EU's mitigation efforts in its updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) submission in 2025, ahead of COP 30. This plan should demonstrate the EU's commitment to contributing its fair share to the global effort required to achieve the 1.5-degree climate goal and meet the emission reduction targets set by the Paris Agreement.**



SECTION

3

# LIMIT THE EU'S GLOBAL LAND USE FOOTPRINT:

Stop unsustainable  
and irresponsible land  
use that drives hunger  
and inequality

The EU makes a disproportionate claim on the world's land through its demand for food, commodities, and energy. An 'extractivist' model of exploiting natural resources and people has contributed to grave land inequality and land degradation. In accordance with the vision developed through the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture,<sup>31</sup> the EU should not consume more land resources than it possesses, and its policies should aim for a responsible and fair land use footprint in agrifood production at home and globally.

Water retention dams on the hillside pictured above Timor-Leste Organic Fertiliser Enterprise (TILOFE) which produces Timor-Leste's only commercial organic fertiliser and is also conserving water at the property through reforestation.

The 'extractivist' economic development model on which many countries, including in the EU, have long relied has contributed to severe land inequality, in which the world's largest 1% of farms operate more than 70% of the world's farmland,<sup>32</sup> and to the fact that today 20–40% of the global land area is degraded or degrading.<sup>33</sup> This threatens the livelihoods of 2.5 billion people involved in smallholder agriculture,<sup>34</sup> and puts at risk food and nutrition security, and the functions of land as habitat for biodiversity, carbon sink and stabilizer of ecosystems and the climate.<sup>35</sup>

The EU already makes a disproportionate claim on globally available land resources through its consumption of food, wood, crops for biofuels, minerals, and other products derived from land. In 2021, the EU was a net importer of bio-based products, requiring 17.2 million hectares outside of the EU, mainly in the form of cropland for vegetable oils and animal feed.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, some EU climate and biodiversity strategies may increase the EU's global land use footprint even more and may do more harm than good.

Bioenergy, for example, which accounts for 59% of the EU's 'renewable energy,' is a land-based approach that has proven more damaging than beneficial in addressing climate change. EU policymakers classified the burning of biomass as 'renewable,' putting it in the same category as genuine zero-carbon energy sources like wind and solar. The surge in demand for biomass has displaced communities and disrupted food production, driving up food insecurity, human rights violations, and land grabs. Biofuel production for European consumption has worsened global food security through land use changes. Meeting Europe's biofuel needs requires 5.3 million hectares of land—an area larger than Denmark. Biodiesel has been touted as a climate solution, but in 2022 emissions from biodiesel were estimated to be a shocking 17% more than fossil diesel emissions when emissions from indirect land use change (ILUC) are accounted for.<sup>37</sup>



Agricultural field



About 15,000 small-scale farmers are members of the Ankole Coffee Producers Cooperative Union (ACPCU), located in the South Western part of Uganda.

Likewise, forest carbon offsets, often promoted as a solution for emissions reduction, have frequently proven ineffective. Many projects protect forests that were never at risk or fail to provide lasting protection at all.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, businesses seeking to offset their emissions by buying carbon credits risk causing large-scale land rights violations in the Global South if robust safeguards are not applied.<sup>39</sup> Although European emissions reduction targets do not currently include offsets through third countries, there is a risk that they will double-count the internal EU offsets traded on the voluntary carbon market, negating those companies' efforts and slowing down public climate policy.<sup>40</sup>

Other land-based climate change solutions genuinely contribute to replacing fossil fuels and hence reducing GHG emissions but may violate existing land users' rights or add pressure to already deeply stressed global land markets. For example, the EU's green and digital transitions require the extraction of critical raw materials, for which the EU has put in place the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act.<sup>41</sup> The EU aims to diversify its supply chains of critical raw materials by sourcing minerals mainly from countries in the Global South. This practice puts the human rights of indigenous peoples and local communities<sup>42</sup> at risk and can threaten local food systems when mining activities pollute the environment or contaminate water and food crops.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, the EU is signing 'green hydrogen' partnerships with various African countries, which will imply using large quantities of land and water for solar and wind energy to produce hydrogen for export to Europe and entailing corporate appropriation of these resources.<sup>44</sup>

While livestock husbandry plays an important role in food and nutrition security and economic development and carries an important cultural value, production of animal proteins is a significant contributor to the land use and climate footprint of food, particularly in high-income countries.<sup>45</sup> Livestock uses large areas of land, mostly for grazing and production of feed crops. One study found that if Europeans shifted from a 60:40 to a 40:60 ratio of animal-source proteins to plant-source proteins within a circular food system, it would generate a 60% reduction in land use and an 81% reduction in GHG emissions compared with the current system, while supporting nutritionally adequate diets.<sup>46</sup>

## Livestock production has a large environmental footprint



Globally, land used for livestock production totals **2.5 billion hectares**<sup>47</sup> – roughly half of global agricultural area (4.8 billion hectares).<sup>48</sup> In the EU, **68%** of total agricultural land is used for animal production.<sup>49</sup>



Livestock consumes **one-third** of the global cereal production as feed.<sup>50</sup>



Livestock agrifood systems are estimated to be responsible for between **11% and 18%** of all anthropogenic GHG emissions.<sup>51</sup>

### Oxfam calls on the EU to:

- Ensure that all EU policies, legislation, and projects that have an impact on land use globally, including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, the Critical Raw Materials Act, policies to reduce and offset carbon, and energy partnerships with third countries, do not deepen already alarming levels of land inequality, compete with food production, or violate land rights, particularly women's land rights or community land rights.
- Ensure that all EU policies and EU supported projects always guarantee the right of Indigenous Peoples and local communities to give or withhold free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) on projects that affect their access to and use of land and natural resources.
- Establish an EU directive that will set binding targets for reducing the EU's material footprint in line with the best available research on sustainable consumption levels.<sup>52</sup> This directive should make provisions for monitoring and reducing the EU's global land footprint.
- Revise EU and national biofuel policies, including the Renewable Energy Directive, to phase out the use of biofuels produced from food, feed, and energy crops and food by-products, and adopt a comprehensive and binding set of environmental and social sustainability criteria, including criteria related to food security and human rights.
- Reduce demand for land-intensive foods, and support a transition to more plant-based diets in high-consuming countries, including by diversifying protein production and consumption and creating incentives for consumers to make more sustainable choices.


# BALANCE THE POWER:

Break corporate  
domination  
and enhance  
equitable global  
food governance


*“What I learned from the food sovereignty movement is that people have been fighting for decades to regain power in their food systems. They are trying to regain it from transnational corporations and those that serve corporate interests. What I have also learned from the food sovereignty movement is that if you change the food system, you change everything.”<sup>53</sup>*

Michael Fakhri, UN special rapporteur on the Right to Food

## A few large transnational corporations dominate global markets in key agricultural inputs and commodities and earn record profits



- In 2021 the five major global agribusinesses (ABCD and COFCO) saw their net profits rise by 75–260%. In 2022 these firms' net profits were 200–300% higher than in 2016–2020.<sup>55</sup>
- The combined profits of the world's nine largest fertiliser companies nearly doubled in 2022, rising from US\$28 to US\$49 billion.<sup>56</sup>
- Many food and beverage corporations capture profits, leaving smallholder farmers impoverished.<sup>57</sup> Large chocolate companies show consistently high profits while Ghanaian farmers' paltry incomes have been falling since 2020. In 2023 Lindt, Mondelez, and Nestlé attained nearly US\$4 billion in profits from chocolate sales, and Hershey's confectionary profits totalled US\$2 billion. These four corporations paid out an average of 97% of their total net profits to shareholders.<sup>58</sup>



Maria is a rural worker, born in the North of Minas Gerais, Brazil. Throughout her life, she had to migrate to other regions in search of sustenance and food.



Migrant workers harvesting.

A transformation of the global food system is urgently needed but is being held back by corporate actors profiting from business as usual. The EU must support stronger, more inclusive global food governance and lead regulatory reform to ensure food companies are held to account for their role in the well-being of farmers and workers in agrifood value chains, in climate change, and in high food prices.<sup>59</sup>

Transnational agrifood corporations have exerted their influence over decision-making not only in the EU<sup>60</sup> but also in the United Nations. The 2021 UN Food Systems Summit, for example, was heavily criticised for allowing multinational agrifood corporations to take over political processes, undermine multilateral institutions of food governance, and capture the global narrative about what the food systems transformation should involve.<sup>61</sup>


This underscores the importance of supporting the long-standing multi-stakeholder platform, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), which promotes a human rights-based approach to food security. The CFS brings to the negotiating table governments, international organisations, UN agencies, civil society (including through the Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples' Mechanism [CSIPM]), and the private sector, balancing the viewpoints of the different stakeholders. Governments retain final decision-making power, ensuring their accountability.<sup>62</sup>

The EU has adopted several promising regulations that must be vigorously implemented and harmonized to protect the environment and human rights. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD)<sup>63</sup> requires large companies to identify and prevent risks to human rights and the environment in their chain of activities, and now the EU must ensure that its member states adequately transpose the CSDDD to the national level and implement it.

The EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products (EUDR) could be an important tool in improving forest governance and supporting smallholders and local communities.<sup>64</sup> The implementation of the EU forced labour regulation,<sup>65</sup> which prohibits economic operators from making available on the EU market any product manufactured using forced labour, is also key. Agriculture represented 12.3% of the 28 million people in a situation of forced labour globally in 2021<sup>66</sup> and it is notable that Europe's own agriculture industry exploits at least 2.4 million migrant farm workers.<sup>67</sup>

Finally, the EU must step up its efforts to strengthen policy coherence. It is urgent to put an end to the unethical double standard whereby hazardous pesticides banned for use in the EU are produced by European companies for export to third countries, where they cause devastating health and environmental impacts.<sup>68</sup>

The EU must also ensure that its trade agreements with low-income countries do not shift agricultural production in those countries toward export crops at the expense of domestic consumption and food and nutrition security. The EU must be conscious of the risk of destroying local markets with its subsidized products that replace domestic products, as occurred with European dairy exports to West Africa for example. EU subsidies not only hurt the livelihoods of West African farmers but also result in overproduction by European dairy farmers, who must then sell their produce at a price below the true production cost.<sup>69</sup> The EU trade agreements should also exclude provisions that require trade partner countries to adopt restrictive seed laws that contradict farmers' rights to freely save, exchange and sell seeds of their choice.<sup>70</sup>



Inspecting a cassava plant, Sierra Leone.

#### Oxfam calls on the EU to:

- **Ensure greater coherence between the EU's agriculture, trade, development, and climate policies. Food is not just another commodity but a human right that the EU must respect in its economic relations and trade negotiations with third countries. The EU must support low-income countries in their efforts to develop their local agrifood sectors.**
- **Ensure timely implementation of the CSDDD at the national level so that large food and agriculture companies and their business partners put an end to human rights violations and environmental degradation and adopt climate transition plans. In addition, ensure immediate implementation of the EUDR and the regulation on forced labour.**
- **Curb corporate power in food systems by putting a halt to further market concentration in global agricultural inputs and commodity markets and by introducing taxes on windfall and excess profits made by transnational food and agricultural companies.**
- **Address the unequal distribution of profits in global agrifood value chains by ensuring that a fair share of value accrues to small-scale farmers and that workers earn at least a living income. Revise the Directive on unfair trading practices in the agricultural and food supply chain to ensure traders do not purchase food products from farmers and other producers under the cost of sustainable production, and implement the CSDDD to ensure a more equal distribution of value.**
- **Actively promote and resource the CFS to enable it to deliver on its global food governance role to tackle hunger and malnutrition, calling on other international and global actors to do the same.**



## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>7</sup> See the methodology note of Oxfam International. (2022). [Profiting from Pain: The Urgency of Taxing the Rich amid a Surge in Billionaire Wealth and a Global Cost-of-Living Crisis](#).
- <sup>8</sup> See, for example, G. Fortuna. (19 February 2024). [‘Over Half of von der Leyen’s Food Policy Promises Weren’t Met, Analysis Shows.’](#) Euronews; B. Tasch. (5 June 2024). [‘Cost of Going Green Sparks Backlash from Europe’s Voters.’](#) BBC News.
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- <sup>10</sup> European Network on Debt and Development (Eurodad) and CounterBalance. (2022). [The Emperor’s New Clothes: What’s New about the EU’s Global Gateway?](#)
- <sup>11</sup> European Parliament. (21 March 2018). [Mergers: Commission Clears Bayer’s Acquisition of Monsanto, Subject to Conditions](#). Press release; and H. von Scharen and I. Keizer. (5 September 2024). [‘Why Did the EU Quietly Approve a Big Agri Mega-Merger This Summer?’](#) EUobserver.
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- <sup>13</sup> K. Richardson et al. (2023). [‘Earth beyond Six of Nine Planetary Boundaries.’](#) *Science Advances*, 9(37), ead42458.
- <sup>14</sup> IFAD. (2013). [Smallholders, Food Security, and the Environment](#). Rome.
- <sup>15</sup> World Bank. (2008). [World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development](#). Washington, DC.
- <sup>16</sup> In 2023, FAO estimated that closing the gender gap in farm productivity and the wage gap in agrifood systems would increase global GDP by 1% (or nearly US\$1 trillion). This would reduce global food insecurity by about 2 percentage points, reducing the number of food-insecure people by 45 million. FAO emphasised that quashing gender disparities in food systems needs to be a global priority. FAO. (2023). [The Status of Women in Agrifood Systems](#). Rome.
- <sup>17</sup> Eurodad and CounterBalance. (2022). [The Emperor’s New Clothes: What’s New about the EU’s Global Gateway?](#); Eurodad, CounterBalance, and Oxfam. (2024). [Who Profits from the Global Gateway? The EU’s New Strategy for Development Cooperation](#).
- <sup>18</sup> For more information, see the European Commission’s webpage [EU Actions to Enhance Global Food Security](#). Accessed 23 August 2024.
- <sup>19</sup> African countries convened in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2003 and agreed on the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). They pledged to increase the growth of agricultural productivity by 6% and to allocate 10% of national budgets to the agriculture sector. This pledge was followed by a 10-year strategy developed in Malabo (the so-called Malabo Declaration of 2014). A new strategy for another 10 years is to be signed in Kampala in 2025. For more information, see African Union Development Agency. (2014). [Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth](#); African Union. (2 August 2024). [The CAADP Post - Malabo Agenda Development Gains Momentum with the Validation of Technical Inputs from Experts](#). Press release.
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